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Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. My name
is Lisa Heinzerling. I am a Professor of Law at the Georgetown University
Law Center. I have also been a visiting professor at the Harvard and Yale
Law Schools. I am a graduate of the University of Chicago Law School,
where I served as editor-in-chief of the University of Chicago Law Review.
After law school I clerked for Judge Richard Posner on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and then for Justice William Brennan of the
U.S. Supreme Court. I was an Assistant Attorney General in the
Environmental Protection Division of the Massachusetts Attorney General’s
Office for three years before coming to Georgetown in 1993. My expertise
is in environmental and administrative law. I am also a Member Scholar of
the Center for Progressive Regulation.
The Center for Progressive Regulation is a nonprofit research and
educational organization of university-affiliated academics with expertise in
the legal, economic, and scientific issues related to regulation of health,
safety, and the environment. CPR supports regulatory action to
protect health, safety, and the environment, and rejects the conservative view
that government’s only function is to increase the economic efficiency of
private markets. Through research and commentary, CPR seeks to inform
policy debates, critique anti-regulatory research, enhance public
understanding of the issues, and open the regulatory process to public
scrutiny.
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My testimony today concerns U.S. legislation designed to implement
international conventions on persistent organic pollutants (“POPs”). I will
make three basic points in this testimony:
1. As currently interpreted, the Toxic Substances Control Act is not
an adequate mechanism for regulating toxic substances. Thus the
implementation of international agreements on POPs is of critical
importance in ensuring the adequacy of future controls on toxic
substances.
2.
The paralyzing procedures contemplated by the “Gillmor
Discussion Draft” [hereinafter “Discussion Draft”] circulating in the
House would virtually guarantee that no new toxic substances would
be added to the list of substances regulated by international
agreements on POPs.
3. Recent assertions by the Executive Branch concerning supposed
constitutional limits on using international decisions to trigger
domestic obligations, and on requiring public notice-and-comment
procedures based on such international decisions, are without merit.
I. The Inadequacy of the Toxic Substances Control Act in Regulating
Toxic Substances
The Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et
seq., appears to hold great promise in controlling toxic substances. However,
in reality, TSCA has delivered very little in the way of such control. As
explained below, one problematic but influential appeals court decision
significantly narrowed the scope of TSCA’s most ambitious program for
regulating toxic substances.
Section 6 of TSCA provides the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) with broad authority to control the manufacture, processing,
distribution in commerce, use, and disposal of chemical substances and
mixtures. Section 6(a) gives the agency a wide-ranging menu of options for
controlling harmful chemicals, including everything from requiring labeling
for such chemicals to banning them altogether. Section 6(a) of TSCA
requires EPA – through the use of the mandatory “shall” – to regulate a
2

chemical substance when the agency finds there is a “reasonable basis” to
conclude that it poses an “unreasonable risk of injury” to human health or
the environment. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a). This provision requires the agency
to regulate such a substance “to the extent necessary to protect adequately
against such risk using the least burdensome requirements.” Id. Section
6(c)(1) instructs the agency, when issuing a rule under section 6(a), to
“consider and publish a statement with respect to” the effects of a chemical
on human health and the environment, the magnitude of exposures to such
chemical, the benefits of the chemical for “various uses and the availability
of substitutes for such uses,” and “the reasonably ascertainable economic
consequences of the rule, after consideration of the effect on the national
economy, small business, technological innovation, the environment, and
public health.” 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1).
TSCA’s section 6 is unique among the federal environmental laws in
the extent to which it allows EPA to regulate harmful substances across
exposure contexts (e.g., workplace and environmental) and across whole
industries, thus giving the agency the opportunity to control essentially all of
the important risks from a harmful chemical at once. As noted, moreover,
the statute also provides the agency with a virtual smorgasbord of regulatory
options for controlling harmful chemicals. As enacted, therefore, TSCA’s
section 6 offered a good deal of promise in the ongoing effort to reduce the
harmful effects of chemicals in our society. Ultimately, however, the law’s
rather vague injunction to protect against “unreasonable risks,” and its
directive to EPA to undertake a cost-benefit balancing under section 6,
contributed to a judicial decision which all but doomed the law to oblivion.
The first and only judicial interpretation of EPA’s authority to ban a
substance under section 6(a) so limited EPA’s authority under this provision
that section 6 has not played a significant role in limiting toxic chemicals in
this country. The interpretation came in the context of a challenge to EPA’s
ban on virtually all manufacturing, processing, distribution in commerce,
and use of asbestos, the agency’s first and only such ban under TSCA.
In 1979, EPA began looking into the possibility of banning asbestos
under section 6 of TSCA. 1 The agency acted in response to increasing
concerns about the harms to human health caused by asbestos. Ten years
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Commercial and Industrial Use of Asbestos Fibers, 44 Fed. Reg. 60,061.
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and a 45,000-page record later, 2 EPA produced a final rule banning virtually
all uses of asbestos in several phases. 3 The agency found that asbestos
posed an unreasonable risk to human health in all stages of its production
and use, and that the substance was thus an appropriate candidate for the
kind of comprehensive regulation offered by TSCA’s section 6. 4
The inevitable legal challenge ensued, and in 1991, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit struck down EPA’s ban on asbestos in what
remains the only judicial treatment of the basic parameters of section 6(a) of
TSCA. The court’s decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d
1201 (5th Cir. 1991), included, among others, the following holdings:
1. In order to regulate under section 6(a) of TSCA, EPA must begin
by examining the least intrusive regulatory alternative (such as
labeling), considering the costs and benefits of such alternative. EPA
may consider a more intrusive regulatory option only if “unreasonable
risks” are predicted to remain under the less onerous alternative. In
order to justify a ban – like the asbestos ban – EPA would have to
examine the costs and benefits of numerous less onerous regulatory
alternatives, and conclude that each would allow unreasonable risks to
remain unaddressed.
2. In examining costs and benefits under section 6(c) of TSCA, EPA
was required to “discount” benefits as well as costs – which, in effect,
means treating regulatory benefits such as lives saved as if they were a
financial investment. Discounting benefits in the context of toxic
chemical control places a large thumb on the scale – against
regulation.
3. EPA may not use unquantified benefits to justify regulating a
harmful chemical, except in close cases.
4. EPA may not exceed undefined limits on how much money it
requires industry to spend to save a human life.
2

PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY at 409
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I examine each of these elements of the court’s decision, and its paralyzing
effect on EPA’s power to regulate persistent organic pollutants under
TSCA’s section 6, in turn.
Detailed Analysis of Less Burdensome Alternatives
In deciding to ban virtually all uses of asbestos, EPA had concluded
that less onerous regulation would not eliminate the unreasonable risks of
asbestos. The agency considered several regulatory alternatives short of a
ban, but concluded that these options would not adequately reduce the
relevant risks. The agency did not conduct a separate analysis of costs and
benefits for each of the less restrictive alternatives it considered.
The court of appeals hearing the challenge to EPA’s rule held that
EPA should have considered each regulatory alternative in detail, beginning
with the least burdensome one and continuing on to more burdensome
alternatives only if, at any given stage, the alternative under consideration
did not reduce risks to a reasonable level. At each stage, moreover, the
agency was required to assess the costs and benefits of the option under
consideration. As the court put it:
Upon an initial showing of product danger, the proper course for the
EPA to follow is to consider each regulatory option, beginning with
the least burdensome, and the costs and benefits of regulation under
each option. The EPA cannot simply skip several rungs, as it did in
this case, for in doing so, it may skip a less-burdensome alternative
mandated by TSCA. Here, although the EPA mentions the problems
posed by intermediate levels of regulation, it takes no steps to
calculate the costs and benefits of these intermediate levels. Without
doing this it is impossible, both for the EPA and for this court on
review, to know that none of these alternatives was less burdensome
than the ban in fact chosen by the agency.
947 F.2d at 1217 (citation omitted). The court justified the imposition of
this heavy procedural burden on the agency by reference to the language of
TSCA, which, the court concluded, offered regulatory options in an order
proceeding from most to least stringent. Id. at 1215-16. In fact, however,
the regulatory options identified in TSCA § 6 are not arranged in the tidy
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order the court perceived. 5 Moreover, even if they were, nothing in TSCA
suggests that EPA is bound to follow the rigid and onerous procedure
required by the court in Corrosion Proof Fittings. Indeed, where, as EPA
did with respect to asbestos, the agency finds that a substance poses
unreasonable risks throughout its industrial life cycle, then the agency is
bound by the terms of the statute to protect against “such risk.” 15 U.S.C.
§2605(a). In those circumstances, a product ban happens to be the “least
burdensome” method available to protect against “such risk.”
Nevertheless, unless the decision is overturned by either the courts or
Congress, Corrosion Proof Fittings remains the definitive statement of what
is required to ban a substance under TSCA. And what is required is
unreasonably and unrealistically onerous. In banning asbestos, as I have
mentioned, EPA spent ten years and produced a 45,000-page record. Yet it
compiled detailed cost and benefit information only on the alternative of
banning asbestos. Imagine the time, resources, and analysis required under
the court of appeals’ approach, which requires EPA to conduct a detailed
cost-benefit analysis of every regulatory option available under TSCA
section 6.
Such a process is not merely onerous; it may well be impossible. In
analyzing the costs and benefits of a ban of asbestos, EPA was faced with
the difficult but not impossible task of trying to identify the risks that would
be avoided if asbestos were no longer used or produced (with very limited
exceptions). Even so, the task was complicated and time-consuming, and
many of the benefits of EPA’s ban – including the prevention of nonfatal
illnesses associated with asbestos, and the prevention of death from any
disease other than cancer – remained unquantified by the agency. Under the
court of appeals’ approach, however, EPA would be forced to figure out
how many lives would be saved by, for example, a particular labeling
requirement; how many saved by a particular disposal requirement; and so
forth. The analytical demands imposed by the court of appeals’ decision are
positively paralyzing.
Discounting Benefits
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For a critique of the court of appeals’ decision on this ground and others, see Thomas O.
McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor
Seidenfeld, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 525, 541-49 (1997).
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In evaluating the costs and benefits of banning asbestos, EPA did not
engage in formal cost-benefit analysis, which would have involved
translating regulatory benefits – such as human lives saved – into monetary
terms. Instead, EPA estimated the economic costs and life-saving benefits
of the rule, and compared the costs and benefits without use of the common
metric of dollars. However, EPA did employ a separate technique
distinctive to formal cost-benefit analysis: it “discounted” the future lifesaving benefits of its rule by 3 percent per year from the year in which the
benefits would accrue. EPA thought that the regulatory benefits of its rule
would accrue as soon as the risks from asbestos were reduced, and so it
discounted these benefits from the (quite near-term) date on which
exposures to asbestos would be reduced.
The court of appeals upheld EPA’s choice of a discount rate, but
disagreed with EPA’s choice of a date from which to discount. The court
thought EPA should have discounted life-saving benefits from the time
when a life-threatening illness would materialize, rather than from the time
when exposures would be reduced. 947 F.2d at 1218. For diseases with
long latency periods, such as the cancers caused by asbestos and prevented
by EPA’s rule, the court of appeals’ approach means discounting future
benefits for years or, more likely, decades longer than EPA’s preferred
approach would have required. Discounting future benefits over many years
greatly reduces their apparent magnitude. To take one famous example, the
deaths of 1 billion people 500 years from now, if discounted to “present
value” at a rate of 5 percent, become equivalent to the death of less than one
person today.
The court in Corrosion Proof Fittings held, moreover, that EPA had
no choice but to discount future benefits. Since EPA had chosen to discount
the future monetary costs imposed by its rule, the court stated that the
agency was required to discount the future benefits as well. Citing only an
article from The Economist magazine, the court reasoned that discounting
benefits was required to maintain an “apples-to-apples” comparison between
costs and benefits. 947 F.2d at 1218.
On the matter of discounting, too, the court of appeals’ opinion in
Corrosion Proof Fittings is deeply problematic. In an ordinary case, one
would expect a court to defer to the agency’s determination that benefits
accrued as soon as the risk from asbestos was reduced. In everyday life,
after all, we regard the removal of a risk as a benefit as soon as it happens;
7

we don’t ordinarily react to the removal of a carcinogen in our environment,
for example, by announcing that we will hold off feeling relieved until the
date when we might have developed cancer had the carcinogen not been
taken away.
Moreover, nothing in TSCA requires the discounting of future nonmonetary benefits such as lives saved. And, since under EPA’s mode of
cost-benefit balancing, lives were not translated into dollars, EPA was
already comparing apples and oranges by considering economic costs on the
one hand and human lives on the other. Nothing in TSCA forbids EPA to
make such a comparison.
Indeed, a large and growing literature challenges the notion that one
must compare monetary costs and human lives on common terms – such as
dollars – in order to make coherent regulatory policy. This literature argues,
to put it simply, that to compare money and lives is necessarily to compare
apples and oranges, no matter how elaborate the economic theory underlying
the effort to transform lives into dollars. 6 This literature also criticizes the
technique of discounting itself, which renders future regulatory benefits
trivial over any substantial discounting interval. 7
The international agreements on POPs are aimed at phasing out
pollutants that, among other things, cause long-latency human diseases such
as cancer. The agreements are also aimed at phasing out pollutants that
persist in the environment over long periods of time and thus pose risks to
future generations. The benefits produced by the treaty are the very kinds of
benefits trivialized through the use of discounting, as required by the court in
Corrosion Proof Fittings. TSCA, as currently interpreted, is thus not an
effective mechanism for controlling these substances.
Limited Role for Unquantified Benefits
In seeking to ban virtually all uses of asbestos, EPA had justified its
decision based partly on unquantified benefits. For example, the agency
used a 13-year time horizon in its analysis of costs and benefits, but
emphasized that the benefits of the rule – though unquantified beyond the
6
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13-year horizon – would continue to occur even past its analytical horizon.
54 Fed. Reg. at 29,486-88. In addition, although the agency was able to
quantify only the benefits of saving lives due to cancers averted, the agency
also cited many other, unquantifiable benefits in support of its rule –
including nonfatal illnesses, fatalities due to causes other than cancer, and
ecological effects. Id. at 29,479, 29,498.
The court in Corrosion Proof Fittings chastised EPA for relying too
heavily on unquantified benefits. The court stated, cryptically, that while
EPA could use unquantified benefits to justify a rule in close cases, it could
not use unquantified benefits to “effect a wholesale shift on the balance
beam.” 947 F.2d at 1219.
The court’s ruling, again, is problematic. Where some benefits are
unquantifiable, how can one even determine whether the quantified part of
the case for a rule is “close”? Again, moreover, the court cites nothing in
TSCA itself that requires the agency to give more respectful attention to
quantified values than to unquantified ones.
And, once more, the court’s interpretation of TSCA makes this statute
an especially weak tool in the context of persistent pollutants. The benefits
of reducing such pollutants are notoriously difficult to quantify. In many
cases, the one benefit that can be quantified with any precision – as in
Corrosion Proof Fittings itself – is the prevention of death from cancer.
Many other serious adverse effects – such as endocrine disruption,
neurological impairment, immune system impairment, ecological damage,
and so forth – are not amenable to precise quantification at this time, in most
cases. The court of appeals’ dismissal of the importance of unquantified
benefits – except in the ill-defined “close cases” category – renders TSCA
an ineffective means of addressing the harms of POPs.
How Much to Spend to Save a Human Life
One last aspect of the decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings that
renders TSCA’s § 6 a weak mechanism for controlling toxic substances is
the court’s holding that EPA had, with the asbestos ban, required industry to
spend too much to save a human life. The court pointed to cost figures per
life saved, disaggregated by industry. These figures showed how much it
would cost to save a life in, for example, the asbestos pipes industry vs. the
asbestos shingles industry vs. the asbestos brakes industry. In some
9

industries, the cost per life saved, when lives were discounted at 3 percent
per year, reached into the tens of millions of dollars. 947 F.2d at 1218,
1222.
The court thought that EPA’s decision to require the asbestos industry
to spend this much to save human lives meant that its review of the costs of
the asbestos rule was deeply flawed: “The EPA's willingness to argue that
spending $ 23.7 million to save less than one-third of a life reveals that its
economic review of its regulations, as required by TSCA, was meaningless.”
947 F.2d at 1223. Thus the court overturned the rule on this ground as well.
Legal scholars have expressed alarm at the court’s aggressive review
of EPA’s asbestos ban. 8 One example of the court’s aggressiveness is, of
course, the court’s intrusion into the agency’s basic policy choice of how
much to spend to save a life. The court cited no statutory authority (other
than the general injunction to consider costs) in coming to its decision, nor
did it explain why disaggregating costs, industry by industry, was the only
way to look at the cost imposed by the rule. Notice, for example, that at an
estimated expense of approximately $460 million, and a savings in lives of
at least 202, the lives “cost” approximately $2.3 million apiece – not a bad
bargain as these things go. In addition, recall that many of the benefits of the
rule could not be quantified. Or, to describe the asbestos rule another way, it
would have cost approximately 14 cents for each person in the U.S. 9
Described in ways other than the one way chosen by the court of appeals, the
asbestos rule seems like quite a reasonable expenditure for the amount of
good it would have done.
TSCA Today
Despite the promise suggested by the text of TSCA section 6(a), that
promise has remained unfulfilled in the years since Corrosion Proof Fittings
was decided. For here was a case in which the agency had spent a decade
compiling a thorough and careful record of the harms caused by one of the
hazardous substances about which we know the most, and yet the court
overturned the agency’s rule and required the agency to conduct almost
8
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impossibly detailed analysis before attempting to ban another substance
under the statute. Perhaps it goes without saying that the agency has not
tried again.
TSCA’s transformation from potentially powerful tool against toxic
substances into an ineffective law is well illustrated by the next action EPA
proposed under section 6(a): a ban on lead fishing sinkers used by
fishermen. EPA, Lead Fishing Sinkers, 59 Fed. Reg. 11122 (Mar. 9, 1994).
Even this rather small action – in comparison to the nationwide, staged ban
on asbestos – never became final. Likewise, EPA’s recent suggestion that it
would use TSCA § 6 to ban the fuel additive MTBE, after MTBE had
contaminated groundwater supplies all over the country, was dropped
without ceremony by the Bush Administration. See Pete Yost, How the
White House Shelved MTBE BAN, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 16, 2004.
The plain fact is that TSCA § 6 is not now a viable mechanism for
meaningfully reducing the risks of toxic substances in this country. This is
why effective implementation of the international agreements on POPs is so
important. However, as I next discuss, current proposals for such
implementation threaten to be even more paralyzing to the process of toxic
substance control than the Corrosion Proof Fittings decision has been.
II. The Paralyzing Requirements of the “Discussion Draft”
If Congress wanted to ensure that no new harmful substances would
ever be regulated by the U.S. under the international agreements on POPs, it
could hardly do better than to pass the “Discussion Draft” bill now
circulating in the House. Merely duplicating the already-ineffective
requirements of TSCA as prerequisites for regulating new POPs would be
bad enough; the Discussion Draft goes even further and offers whole new
obstacles to meaningful toxic substance control. Better, in truth, to have no
mechanism at all for adding new substances to the list – the route originally
preferred by the current Administration 10 – than to offer this charade in
place of a meaningful listing process.
Before delving into the details of the Discussion Draft, it is worth
bearing in mind the context in which EPA action under the POPs
10
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implementing legislation will occur.
The domestic listing process
contemplated in the Discussion Draft begins only after international panels
have engaged in a thorough, science-based process of review and have
concluded that a new substance warrants regulation under the international
agreements for POPs. 11
This process includes scientific findings by the so-called Persistent
Organic Pollutants Review Committee, a group of experts in risk analysis
designated by parties to the POPs treaty and chosen for their expertise and
with equitable geographical distribution in mind. Stockholm Convention art.
19(6)(a). The Committee reviews chemicals for possible inclusion on the
POPs list through evaluation of the chemicals in light of several screening
criteria. Id., art. 8(3). If the Conference of the Parties decides that a
chemical is a good candidate for listing, then the Committee goes back to
work and conducts a detailed risk profile of the chemical in question. If,
based on this analysis, the Committee determines that a chemical “is likely,
as a result of its long-range environmental transport, to lead to significant
adverse human health and/or environmental effects such that global action is
warranted,” id., art. 8(7)(a), then the matter returns to the Conference of the
Parties, which decides whether to list the chemical based on an assessment
of the scientific evidence and analysis of possible control measures for the
chemical. Id., Annex F.
The POPs treaty explicitly takes a protective, precautionary approach
to regulating POPs. The preamble states: “Mindful of the precautionary
approach as set forth in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, the objective of this Convention is to protect human
health and the environment from persistent organic pollutants.” Stockholm
Convention, art. 1. Article 8(7)(a) of the Convention specifically states that
“[l]ack of full scientific certainty shall not prevent the proposal [to list a new
chemical] from proceeding,” and Article 8(9) provides that the Conference
of the Parties, “taking due account of the recommendations of the
Committee, including any scientific uncertainty, shall decide, in a
precautionary manner, whether to list the chemical.” In the fierce current
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debates over precautionary approaches to environmental policy, therefore,
the POPs treaty comes down firmly on the side of precaution. 12
Despite the thorough, science-based review preceding the
international listing process, the Discussion Draft would require EPA
essentially to start all over again, if it acts at all in response to the
international recommendations. The problems with the Discussion Draft’s
approach to listing new POPs include the following: excessive discretion on
the part of EPA; duplication of scientific effort; unnecessary and
problematic injunctions to the agency to use “sound science”; and biased and
paralyzing directives to undertake cost-benefit balancing and to give
economic costs particularly close attention. I discuss each of these problems
in turn.
EPA discretion
The Discussion Draft does not require EPA to act at all in response to
international recommendations on listing new POPs. Instead, it simply
states that EPA “may” regulate in response to such recommendations.
§502(e)(1)(A). In addition, after international bodies have undertaken
painstaking review of the harms caused by substances that are candidates for
regulation, EPA has discretion whether even to consider those bodies’
recommendations; here, too, the permissive “may” is used in the Discussion
Draft. § 502(e)(3). So little, apparently, do the Discussion Draft’s authors
think of the international scientific review process, that the findings from
this process are labeled merely “additional considerations” in the Draft. Id.
Moreover, even if EPA does act in response to the international
recommendations, there is no deadline in the Discussion Draft for a
conclusion to be reached and a regulation to issue. Finally, if EPA does not
act, there is no “action-forcing” mechanism, such as the citizen petition
process contained in TSCA § 21, which would bring pressure to bear on
EPA for its failure to act.
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The Discussion Draft, in short, leaves the decision whether to do
anything in response to international recommendations on regulation of new
substances completely up to EPA.
Duplication of scientific effort
As discussed, the international scientific review committee on POPs
will conduct a detailed analysis of the scientific case for adding a new
chemical to the list under the POPs treaty. Remarkably, however, the
Discussion Draft not only, as noted above, gives EPA discretion in deciding
whether even to consider the international recommendations on new POPs
listings, it also directs EPA to conduct entirely new scientific analyses of
candidate chemicals. EPA is, according to the Discussion Draft, required to
consider a scientific assessment of the effects of candidate chemicals on
health and the environment, and to consider the magnitude of exposures of
these chemicals experienced by humans and the environment. §502(e)(2)(AB). It is unclear what is expected to be gained by this duplicative scientific
review. Compounding the problem is, as I discuss next, the Discussion
Draft’s cryptic and troubling invocations of “sound science.”
“Sound science”
The Discussion Draft provides:
In assessing risks and effects, the Administrator shall use sound and
objective scientific practices, and shall determine the weight of the
scientific evidence concerning such risks or effects based on the best
available scientific information, including peer-reviewed studies, in
the rulemaking record.
§ 502(e)(4).
It is hard to know quite what to make of this provision. On the one
hand, it is not unusual for federal laws regulating risks to direct the relevant
agencies to use the “best available evidence” in coming to their decisions.
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (regarding health standards under
Occupational Safety and Health Act). Viewed in that light, the provision is a
rather benign reminder to EPA to use good science in deciding whether to
regulate additional POPs – a reminder that merely duplicates the
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Administrative Procedure Act’s injunction against arbitrary and capricious
agency decision making.
On the other hand, “sound … scientific practices,” or “sound science,”
has, in conservative circles, become a buzzword for skepticism about
findings of risk to humans and the environment due to chemicals, products,
industrial pollution, etc. The movement for “sound science,” in fact, began
with the tobacco industry’s efforts to counter scientific evidence of the
harms of their products. Thus the presence in this bill of references to the
ill-begotten “sound science” theme raises the troubling possibility that this
provision will be used not merely to duplicate the APA’s salutary injunction
against arbitrary and capricious agency decisions, but instead will be used
somehow to block important scientific information from being considered in
the process of deciding whether to regulate additional POPs.
The Discussion Draft’s reference to “peer-reviewed studies” raises
similar possibilities. On the one hand, the bill does not limit EPA’s
consideration only to peer-reviewed studies, and thus the bill may be taken
to mean simply that EPA should include peer-reviewed studies, where
possible, in its scientific examinations – something the agency does
routinely in any event. On the other hand, “peer review,” like “sound
science,” has become a kind of rallying cry for industry and regulatory
skeptics within the Administration, and sometimes has come to mean review
by “peers” within industry is favored over review by other scientific experts.
Here, too, therefore, the meaning of the provision on science is unclear, but
portents of mischief abound.
Cost-benefit analysis
The Discussion Draft would weigh down the process for listing new
POPs with stultifying, time-consuming, resource-intensive, and
systematically biased analytical requirements. I discuss these requirements
below. But first, it is important to note that nothing in the Discussion Draft
requires EPA even to publish the results of its detailed analysis. Whereas
TSCA itself explicitly states the EPA must “consider and publish a statement
with respect to” costs, benefits, and potential substitute substances, 15
U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1), the Discussion Draft merely requires EPA to
“consider” the listed factors. § 502(e)(2). The contrast between TSCA and
the Discussion Draft is striking particularly because the language regarding
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publishing a statement comes from the part of TSCA that is otherwise
quoted quite closely in the Discussion Draft.
If EPA decided not to regulate a POP newly listed pursuant to the
POPs treaty, therefore, there is no guarantee that EPA would even be forced
to explain why it decided not to do so. This is especially so since the
Discussion Draft provides no process for citizen petitions calling upon the
agency to act when it has failed to act. If EPA decided to regulate a newly
listed POPs, however, it would of course have to explain its decision under
the APA. Thus the Discussion Draft in this way, too, contains an internal
bias against listing new POPs.
The problems go deeper still. The Discussion Draft allows EPA to
regulate a newly listed POP only “to the extent necessary to protect human
health and the environment that achieves a reasonable balance of social,
environmental, and economic costs and benefits.” § 502(e)(1)(A). The
Draft affords no clue, however, as to how a “reasonable balance” is to be
identified. Although the Draft does provide a laundry list of factors EPA is
to consider in coming to a decision, § 502(e)(2)(A-E), it does not give EPA
guidance as to how to figure out what a “reasonable balance” of costs and
benefits is. Here, too, therefore, the Discussion Draft affords EPA a huge
amount of discretion in making decisions on newly listed POPs. Moreover,
given the precedent of Corrosion Proof Fittings, one must worry about the
courts’ ultimate role in policing exactly which regulatory measures afford a
“reasonable balance” between costs and benefits and which do not.
Quite apart from the large amount of discretion afforded by the illdefined “reasonable balance” standard is the internal bias against regulation
embedded in that standard. Cost-benefit balancing is notoriously, and
systematically, biased against environmental regulation. It is particularly
skewed against environmental regulation that targets pollutants like the
POPs – pollutants with large but insidious and sometimes subtle effects,
spread over a vast population (in this case, the whole world) and reaching
into the distant future. 13
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See generally Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 Geo.
L.J. 2025 (1999).
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Here are some of the basic features of cost-benefit balancing that
systematically bias it against environmental protection, particularly
protection against pollutants like POPs: 14
• Many of the benefits of reducing these pollutants cannot be
quantified. In many cases, avoiding cancer is the only benefit that can
be quantified. This leaves all other causes of death, plus all nonfatal
illnesses avoided and all ecological effects, left out of the numerical
tally of costs and benefits. When a benefit is not quantified, its worth
is typically treated as if it were zero in a cost-benefit balancing.
• The costs of regulating environmental risks are often overstated, and
often by a large amount. 15
• Even when benefits can be quantified, the process of fitting values
like human lives and health into a cost-benefit balance is fraught with
difficulty. Sometimes, monetary values are attached to benefits such
as human lives. These values are generally based on the amount of
extra income male workers in the 1970s were willing to accept in
exchange for increased workplace risks. The monetary values arising
from this context not only tell us little about these workers’ own
values (there is no evidence they actually knew the precise risks they
faced, or could afford to turn down a risky job even if they did know),
but tell us even less about the monetary values one might attached to
risks of cancer, risks that are involuntarily imposed, risks to future
generations, and so forth. They tell us little, in other words, about the
value of controlling the risks of POPs.
• The technique of discounting – required by the court in Corrosion
Proof Fittings despite the absence of a statutory mandate for it –
belittles desires to protect this and future generations against longterm and persistent risks. Discounting would easily trivialize the
benefits of regulating POPs. Yet protection of the future – for our
own generation, our children’s generation, and generations yet to
14
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17

come – is one of the basic principles animating a document like the
POPs treaty. Discounting, through an arcane and seemingly technical
process, silently undermines this animating principle. 16
• Cost-benefit balancing typically relies on a starkly impoverished view
of what matters when it comes to risk. Frequently, cost-benefit
analysis looks solely at the probability and magnitude of harm, in
numerical terms, rather than also at the cultural and moral context in
which that harm might be inflicted. Thus cost-benefit analysis most
often ignores the kinds of considerations – an aversion to involuntary
and uncontrollable risks, a preference for an equitable distribution of
risk, a desire to avoid consequences that threaten whole communities
– that most people take into account in judging risk.
These are, in brief, some of the most fundamental reasons why cost-benefit
balancing is a bad idea in the context of environmental protection. Its use in
the POPs implementing legislation would virtually ensure that no new POPs
will be regulated in this country pursuant to the international agreements on
POPs. If this is what the authors of the Discussion Draft desire, they should
say so directly, and not hide behind the seemingly objective face of costbenefit balancing.
Even if cost-benefit balancing were not systematically biased against
regulation of POPs, the analytical requirements imposed by the Discussion
Draft would nevertheless paralyze any effort to regulate POPs. The
Discussion Draft goes beyond TSCA § 6 – which, you will recall, has been
buried under the onerous analytical requirements ladled into it by the court
in Corrosion Proof Fittings – and adds even more factors for EPA to
consider in deciding whether to regulate POPs. In addition to all of the
factors listed in TSCA’s § 6, the Discussion Draft would also require EPA to
consider the risks and economic consequences of, plus a laundry list of other
factors relating to, substitutes for chemical substances. § 502(e)(2)(C). In
addition, the Draft would require EPA to consider not only the costs,
benefits, effects on the national economy, etc., of a regulatory decision, but
also “the degree to which the manufacture, processing, distribution in
commerce for export, use, or disposal of the chemical substance or mixture
is necessary to prevent significant harm to an important sector of the
16
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economy. § 502(e)(2)(D). In other words, even if the cost-benefit profile
tilted in the direction of regulation, EPA must nevertheless go on to consider
whether an industry would be too hard-hit by a regulation to proceed.
Finally, EPA must, according to the Discussion Draft, also consider not only
the national, but also the international, consequences of a regulatory action.
§ 502(e)(2)(E).
This is a research agenda and analytical program to fill several
lifetimes. Even under the relatively “streamlined,” pre-Corrosion Proof
Fittings version of TSCA, it took EPA ten years and 45,000 pages to justify
its asbestos ban. And even then the court overturned the rule for lack of
sufficient analysis. The Discussion Draft dumps even more analytical
requirements on EPA, with the likely result that no rule would ever see the
light of day under this framework.
III.
The Administration’s Constitutional Arguments Regarding
Implementation of the POPs Conventions Are Without Merit
The Bush Administration has recently voiced two different kinds of
arguments implicating Congress’s authority to enact legislation
implementing the international agreements on POPs. Both arguments are
without merit.
First, the Department of Justice has argued, in a letter to Senator Tom
Harkin dated March 25, 2004, that mandatory notice-and-comment
procedures in POPs implementing legislation (there, the Department was
discussing amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)), would “raise constitutional concerns.” Letter
from William Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative
Affairs, to The Honorable Tom Harkin (March 25, 2004). It appears that the
Department was under the impression that merely seeking out the views of
the public, while international proceedings on whether to add pollutants to
the list of POPs were ongoing, would interfere with the Executive’s treatymaking powers. The letter is exceedingly thin on legal authority, and even
thinner on common sense: it provides no sensible reason to think that merely
requiring notice and an opportunity for comment, without any obligation to
change one’s international negotiating position, interferes with the
Executive’s prerogatives. The letter is of a piece with the Administration’s
other recent, extravagant claims of Executive prerogatives, offered in
contexts ranging from its refusal to make public information concerning
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Vice-President Cheney’s Energy Task Force, to its arguments concerning
the treatment of detainees in Cuba, to its alarming claims, in memoranda on
the treatment of prisoners in the ongoing “war on terror,” regarding the
Executive’s immunity from the requirements of the Geneva Convention. A
detailed and persuasive refutation of the Department’s analysis is attached to
CIEL senior attorney Glenn Wiser’s written testimony for today’s hearing.
Although the Discussion Draft does indeed provide an opportunity for public
notice and comment, the rebuttal to the Department of Justice’s
constitutional arguments is important to keep in mind if future implementing
bills do not require notice and comment early in the international process.
A second constitutional argument that has attended discussions of
POPs implementing legislation has to do with what is sometimes known as
the “international nondelegation doctrine.” The idea is that if Congress
obligates the Executive branch to act in response to the decision of an
international body, that is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority.
To understand this claim, it is helpful to understand the exact context
in which it might arise. Under the POPs treaty, new POPs may be added
only by consensus of the parties or, failing consensus, by a three-quarters
majority of the parties. Stockholm Convention, arts. 22(4), 21(1-3). Parties
may, in individual cases, decide not to accept a new POPs listing. Id., arts.
22(3)(b), 22(4). Or, in the alternative, parties may, at the time of ratifying
the treaty itself, select the “opt-in” alternative, which means that they will
not be bound by any new pollutant listing unless they affirmatively indicate
their intention to be bound. Id., art. 25(4).
Thus, with respect to deciding whether to accept new pollutant listings
under the POPs treaty, the U.S. has three options: (1) it can accept a decision
of the Conference of the Parties to regulate a new pollutant; (2) it can, on a
case-by-case basis, decide not to accept the new listing; or (3) it can, in
ratifying the treaty, elect the opt-in provision, thus requiring affirmative
action to regulate a new pollutant in every case of a new listing.
If the Executive chooses not to take the last route – that is, it does not
select the opt-in option – then there would seem to no meritorious
constitutional complaint about being bound by international decisions on
new POPs. The Executive’s assent to such decisions would be embedded in
the original treaty itself. Likewise, if Congress embodied this assent in
20

implementing legislation which required EPA to take action to control newly
listed chemicals, there would be no constitutional problem. Indeed, many
laws implementing international obligations take this general form. The
Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances, for example, provides that
the original standards of the Protocol may be strengthened by a majority
vote of the parties, and that vote is binding on the parties. The Clean Air
Act implements this agreement by requiring EPA to take the actions required
by the stricter standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7671e(a)(3). Similarly, the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (“CITES”) provides for international decisions adding endangered
species to the list of protected species, and the Endangered Species Act
prohibits trade in internationally listed species. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(c). Other
examples may be found in the memorandum attached to Glenn Wiser’s
written testimony for this hearing.
I am aware of no case law disputing the proposition that agencies may
be obligated to act in response to decisions of international bodies where a
treaty and statute require them to do so. Indeed, the case law I am aware of
supports this proposition. In George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616
(D.C. Cir. 1998), the D.C. Circuit held that EPA was, in setting new rules for
reformulated gasoline, justified in taking into account a WTO ruling against
EPA’s previous rule. Although the Clean Air Act did not specifically give
EPA the authority to take this ruling into account in establishing its rule, the
court expressed a desire to avoid any confrontation with U.S. treaty
obligations, and upheld EPA’s consideration of the WTO ruling. The case
would have been even easier for EPA had the statute explicitly allowed
consideration of the international body’s decision in setting domestic
regulatory policy.
Thus, it appears that the U.S. could, without any constitutional
problem, choose the “opt-out” option of the POPs treaty, meaning that it
would be required to regulate any newly listed pollutants unless it
affirmatively indicated its desire not to accept the listing of such pollutants.
The other context in which the constitutional arguments that have
floated about these issues might arise is if the U.S. selected the “opt-in”
option under the POPs treaty. In that case, an affirmative act by the U.S.
would be required for any new POPs to be regulated here. This is the
situation in which we find ourselves today, as the Administration has
indicated that this is the option it will choose when the treaty is ratified.
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In this situation, the question becomes whether Congress could, in the
legislation implementing the POPs treaty, require EPA to act in response to
a new listing decision by the Conference of the Parties. Suppose, for
example, that the legislation simply required EPA to make a decision as to
whether to regulate a newly listed POP. The international decision to list the
POP would be the trigger for requiring EPA to come to a decision about
whether to regulate the new POP. This kind of regime would pose no
constitutional problem. Congress often requires agencies to act when certain
conditions are met. Indeed, the more precise the conditions that trigger
agency action, the less Congress’s actions even come close to running afoul
of the constitutional prohibition reflected in the nondelegation doctrine
(which, it must be noted, has not been found by the Supreme Court to have
been violated in almost 70 years). Whether the trigger for agency
consideration of a problem is an agency factual finding, a state decision, or
an international decision, the conclusion remains the same: Congress is
entitled to require agency action based on satisfaction of a condition
precedent identified by Congress.
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